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| At the risk of over simplification, it appears there was an era -- some might call it a Golden Age -- when Canada’s system of government worked to the satisfaction of most involved parties. Officials were expected to have, and may have actually had, full knowledge of their files. They knew of the affairs and views of the significant parties who might be affected by any policy, regulatory or legislative initiatives envisioned by government. Officials used their knowledge as the basis for proffering independent, disinterested, confidential advice to Ministers and Cabinet on government initiatives, and to guide them in implementing these initiatives once they were approved. The role of Ministers, along with government MPs, was to make decisions, and to then forge the needed consensus around the measures they decided. This, in simplified form, was the way Canada’s Westminster-style Parliamentary democracy ran. In this setting, at the development phase of policy or lawmaking, external affected and interested "publics", experts, and other members of the "policy community" who decision-makers selected, were invited to discuss, usually in confidence, such matters and initiatives as officials, Ministers, and MPs might wish to raise with them. Otherwise, access to the public policy decision-making process principally lay in lobbying Ministers and MPs via direct contact, or in appearing before Parliamentary committees which reviewed and scrutinized government proposals. If one had no other access, then there was always the intervention vehicle of last resort -- the press. The dynamics of government evolved over the years. Underlying the changes was the generally increasing complexity of society and the economy, and of government’s role in these. In the same way as it became impossible even for specialized subject-matter experts to follow the increased knowledge in their own areas of specialization, likewise officials in government increasingly were unable to accurately forecast the effect of policy, regulation, legislation or even program changes they wanted to pursue. All too often, their initiatives, once announced or implemented, had unexpected, and even perverse, results. One solution to this was more complete consultation with potentially affected parties on proposed initiatives. By talking directly to potential "regulatees" or other interested parties, officials could propose actions to Ministerial and Cabinet decision makers with more confidence that the results would be as intended. Government thus began developing an institutional "culture of consultation" largely so it could make more accurate impact assessments of its initiatives. Exploring options and variations with outside parties about how to achieve specified goals was found to be useful, and not inconsistent with the manner in which decision-making took place. Government officials, increasingly in recent decades, have consciously worked to build a "culture of consultation". It gradually came to be expected that proposals to Ministers, to Cabinet, to Parliament, would be the product of an open, transparent, and increasingly structured consultation process which would involve all the affected and interested parties. Because these consultations preceded, and took place outside the formal decision-making process, they represented no challenge to the hierarchical and narrowly-cast, and by law secretive, decision-making structures associated with our form of Parliamentary government. In more recent years, the notion of consultations has taken on a new and additional impetus, as reflected in the most recent Federal Regulatory Policy. In many areas of government activity, consultations with affected publics and "stakeholders" are now mandatory. When any policy, regulatory or legislative initiative of any significance is contemplated, it is expected that consultations will occur, and the goal now is not simply to provide feedback on the impact of intended government initiatives. The new intent is to at least try to develop a common, shared definition among stakeholders and decision-makers of the problem (or opportunity) being addressed, to define common objectives, to explore alternative ways of achieving the goal. Ideally, it results in a convergence of views around a preferred course of action which government, in partnership with others, can take. In some instances, consultation is even intended to create shared program delivery "partnerships", or in a devolution of responsibility to stakeholders, which will ultimately requires an openly negotiated statutory or regulatory change. In this setting, officials are increasingly seen not being independent, disinterested advisors, but as facilitators of stakeholder consultation processes which define problems, explore options, and forge a consensus around solutions and initiatives. Senior officials -- and in some instances Ministers -- are expected not just to render final judgements on the output of consultative processes, but are called on to make the iterative decisions needed to allow consensus, or "negotiated" solutions, to emerge. In this setting, and in real practice, Cabinet and its committees are called on not to actually make decisions, but to use their authority as the holders of the Great Seal of Canada to ratify agreed-upon negotiated solutions arising from consultation processes. Clearly, the role of consultation has moved well beyond being simply a tool for impact assessment of intended government initiatives. Consultative processes are now, in practice, a real, although largely undefined, part of the public policy and government decision-making process. The implications of having built a "culture of consultations" within the framework of an unchanged formal decision-making process of government decision-making, has been given little attention. While there is much on the government’s rule books about the necessity of conducting consultations, and the importance of forging as much consensus as possible around proposed initiatives, and while there are "best practises" guidance documents to show the way, there is considerable ambiguity, and even tension, in the relationship between consultations, and the formal, constitutional decision-making process associated with our form of democratic government. Looking to the future, the tension between the government’s desire to be a consensus builder, on the one hand, and the extant, constitutional decision-making structures on the other, is likely to increase as the government pursues its even newer goal of increased "citizen engagement". In essence, most consultation practices are intended to focus on "stakeholders", who are the representative of organized economic and social interests. More recently, in response to widespread feelings of citizen detachment from government, and feelings of being excluded from decision-making processes, the government has committed itself to engaging Canadians directly as individual citizens in the consideration and resolution of issues. Such engagement is seen to be good in and of itself because it may help re-connect Canadians with the government, and because it will better ensure that government initiatives reflect the values of its citizens. It is difficult to see how this will not, however, also impact de facto on decision-making, and result in further practical constraints being placed on Ministers and Cabinets in making decisions which may vary from a consensus of engaged, largely self-selecting citizens, in official fora established specifically to include them in decision-making. One clear result is that the
role of both the official and the politician is now much different than
that found in the classical model, as described in our constitution.
Moreover, the anonymous, detached
bureaucrat who collected evidence to determine that a problem
existed, and who confidentially and independently advised Ministers
on what to do, no longer fits the description of what most officials
do for a living. Nor is the role of Ministers and Cabinet now
simply to reflect on the advice proffered by officials, to make
decisions they feel are correct, and to then move into the
Parliamentary and public fora to build a consensus around
proposed measures. They are now expected to show a consensus around
their proposed initiatives long before any Cabinet or Parliamentary
processes ensue, and, presumably, to support the enactment of
consensus solutions that may have emerged through consultation and
public engagement processes, whether they like them or not. If they
choose to do otherwise, they may pay
a very high
political price. |